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NOTES
The Eleventh Amendment-The Fourth Circuit's Adaptation
of Hess v. Trans-Hudson Port Authority Corp. in Gray v.
Laws
The reasonable man adapts himself to the world: the unreason-
able one persists in trying to adapt the world to himself Therefore all
progress depends on the unreasonable man.'
The Eleventh Amendment is one of the Constitution's most pro-
vocative, elusive, and infrequently discussed provisions The
Amendment reads:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be con-
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any foreign
state.
Historically, courts have construed this Amendment quite
broadly, granting a shield of sovereign immunity to -the states.4 This
interpretation has protected states from suits in federal court in law,
equity, or admiralty, by a state's own citizens, citizens of other states,
and citizens of other countries.5 In most cases, the Eleventh
Amendment's doctrine of sovereign immunity has protected uncon-
senting states from all suits in federal court.'
1. CONCISE DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 290 (1985) (quoting GEORGE BERNARD
SHAW, MAN AND SUPERMAN I).
2. See William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment:
A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition
Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033,1033 (1983); see also Calvin R. Massey, State
Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 61 (1989)
(commenting that the wording of the Eleventh Amendment is "deceptively simple").
3. U.S. CONsT. amend. XI.
4. See John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A
Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1890 (1983).
5. See EDWN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 367-68 (2d ed. 1994). For a
comprehensive summary of the sovereign immunity doctrine and the Eleventh Amend-
ment, see 12 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 300.03 (2d ed.
1995); 13 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JU-
RISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS 2D § 3524 (2d ed. 1984).
6. See Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 486 (1987);
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A literal reading of the Eleventh Amendment suggests, however,
that its protection is not so sweeping. 7 The jurisprudential develop-
ment of the doctrine indicates that the scope of states' immunity is
both narrower and broader than the Amendment suggests. In the
past, the debate has centered on solving the questions of which par-
ties can utilize the immunity protection of the Eleventh Amendment
to block a federal suit and which parties may successfully bypass its
protection.
Courts frequently have been called upon to determine whether
counties, municipalities, or municipal agencies are protected by the
Amendment's blanket of immunity.8 Traditionally, the general rule
applied indicates that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits
against these entities because local entities are not considered "arms
of the state."9 Other entities, including state agencies and universi-
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-99 (1984). In addition,
courts have opened the Amendment's umbrella of immunity protection to United States
territories. See Ramirez v. Puerto Rico Fire Serv., 715 F.2d 694, 697 (1st Cir. 1983)
(stating that Puerto Rico enjoys Eleventh Amendment protection); Ezratty v. Puerto
Rico, 648 F.2d 770,776 n.7 (1st Cir. 1981) (holding that Puerto Rico is a state for the pur-
poses of the Eleventh Amendment).
7. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits brought against states by the United
States. See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 104-06; Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 614 (1983);
United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965); United States v. Texas, 143 U.S.
621, 646 (1892). The Amendment also does not bar the suit or limit the remedy in cases
brought by a state against another state. See Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 182
n.9 (1982); North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365,372-73 (1923); Rhode Island v. Mas-
sachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657,720 (1838); see also Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725,
745 n.21 (1981) ("[A]n original action between two states only violates the Eleventh
Amendment if the plaintiff state is actually suing to recover for injuries to specific indi-
viduals."). The Amendment also has not been extended to bar suits against states in the
courts of other states. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421 (1979). For a discussion of
Nevada v. Hall, see Margaret G. Stewart, The State as an Unwilling Defendant: Reflec-
tions on Nevada v. Hall, 59 NEB. L. REv. 246 (1980); Sandra A. Girifarco, Comment, The
Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity and Full Faith and Credit: No Constitutional
Refuge for a State as a Defendant, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 57 (1980).
More significantly, however, the Court has recently decided that the Eleventh
Amendment does not bar appellate jurisdiction in the form of Supreme Court review of
cases brought in state court where the state is a party. See McKesson Corp. v. Division of
Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, Dep't of Bus. Regulation, 496 U.S. 18, 30-31 (1990)
("We recognize what has long been implicit in our consistent practice and uniformly en-
dorsed in our cases: The Eleventh Amendment does not constrain the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over cases arising from state courts.").
8. See 12 MOORE ET AL., supra note 5, 1 300.03[3.4] (discussing the Eleventh
Amendment's doctrine concerning state agencies, counties, boards, towns, cities and
other entities).
9. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 386; see, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence,
Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980); Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274, 280-81 (1977); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530-31 (1890); Lytle v.
Commissioner of Election, 541 F.2d 421, 426 (4th Cir. 1976). Eleventh Amendment pro-
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ties, have received extremely inconsistent treatment by the courts."
In addition, courts have encountered difficulty interpreting the dis-
tinction between local and state agencies when the local agency
exercises state power in such a way that the protection is necessary
"to protect the state treasury from liability that would have had es-
sentially the same practical consequences as a suit brought against
the state."'1 Courts have not, however, afforded protection to politi-
cal subdivisions that merely exercise a "slice of state power."12
The original text of the Constitution does not expressly provide
tection generally has not extended to suits brought against local governmental agencies.
See infra note 12 and accompanying text. Professor Chemerinsky has offered this ration-
ale for the Court's interpretation:
The ability to sue local governments in federal court is significant because it is
this level of government that provides most social services in this country, such
as police and fire protection, education, and sanitation. Therefore, if the Elev-
enth Amendment barred suits against municipalities, federal courts could not
ensure compliance with the Constitution by those who are most likely to violate
it.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 386.
10. State universities have received varied Eleventh Amendment protection by the
courts. Compare Goss v. San Jacinto Junior College, 588 F.2d 96, 98-99 (5th Cir.)
(holding that a junior college could not be considered a "political subdivision" under
Texas law), modified, 595 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1979), Durham v. Parks, 564 F. Supp. 244,
246 (D. Minn. 1983) (specifying that the state constitution put the university out of state
control for immunity purposes), and Gordenstein v. University of Del., 381 F. Supp. 718,
721 (D. Del. 1974) (determining that the university was not a state for purposes of the
Eleventh Amendment), with Clay v. Texas Women's Univ., 728 F.2d 714,716-17 (5th Cir.
1984)(granting Eleventh Amendment immunity when the university alone was named as
the defendant), Board of Governors of the Univ. of N.C. v. Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp.
167, 174 (M.D.N.C. 1989) (determining that the University of North Carolina was an alter
ego of the state), and Ewing v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 552 F. Supp. 881,
883-84 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
Eleventh Amendment case law offers another fine distinction. While a bridge and
tunnel district have been given Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Chesapeake Bay
Bridge & Tunnel Dist. v. Laurtizen, 404 F.2d 1001, 1003 (4th Cir. 1968), disavowed by
Faust v. South Carolina State Highway Dep't, 721 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1983) (determining
that a state does not waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity when it undertakes activi-
ties on navigable waters under federal regulation), a bridge and tunnel authority has been
held not immune, see Raymond Int'l Inc. v. The MT Dalzelleagle, 336 F. Supp. 679, 681-
82 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
11. Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 401
(1979).
12. See id. at 401; see also Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.54
(1978) (stating that neither the Tenth nor Eleventh Amendments offer protection for
municipalities against suits); Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 280-81 (concluding that a school
board was a "political subdivision" under Ohio law and therefore unable to receive Elev-
enth Amendment assistance from suit); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 717-
21 (1973) (determining that a county is a "citizen" and not an arm of the state for federal
diversity purposes); Lincoln County, 133 U.S. at 530 (limiting the reach of the Eleventh
Amendment "to those suits in which the State is a party on the record").
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sovereign immunity for the states." The exclusion of such a doctrine
stirred heated debate at the state ratification conventions.14 The
13. See Gibbons, supra note 4, at 1895. As Justice Stevens noted in Nevada v. Hall,
440 U.S. 410, 415 (1979), at common law in England, "[t]he King's immunity rested pri-
marily on the structure of the feudal system and secondarily on a fiction that the King
could do no wrong." Id.
The term "sovereign immunity" does not appear at any point in the Constitution.
See Jennifer G. Schecter, Note, Constitutional Law-Sovereign Immunity-A Bistate
Entity, Created By the Compact Clause and Financially Independent of Its Founding
States, Is Not Entitled To Eleventh Amendment Immunity From Suit in Federal Courts-
Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 115 S. Ct. 394 (1994), 26 SETON HALL L. REV.
431,432 n.6 (1995).
Article I, § 2 of the United States Constitution outlines the boundaries of federal
judicial power. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Congress does not possess the power to
broaden the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts beyond the scope of Article
M. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 12 (1985). Federal jurisdic-
tion has, however, been extended in some areas to effectuate the policies behind Article
III, including statutes providing for removal of cases to federal courts, for ancillary juris-
diction, and for pendent jurisdiction. See id. Article I classifies the federal judicial
power into nine categories of cases and controversies. U.S. CONST. art. III. Two of these
provisions provide:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases ... between a State and Citizens of
another State ... and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens, or Subjects.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. The Eleventh Amendment modified the interpretation of these
two clauses, facially eliminating the amenability of states to suits in federal court by citi-
zens of other states. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 370.
14. Professor Chemerinsky writes:
A key matter in dispute is whether the ... language of Article III was meant to
override the sovereign immunity that kept states from being sued in state courts.
There is no record of any debate about this issue or these clauses at the Consti-
tutional Convention. However, at the state ratification conventions the question
of suits against state governments in federal court was raised and received a
great deal of attention. States had incurred substantial debts, especially during
the Revolutionary War, and there was a great fear of suits being brought against
the states in federal court to collect on these debts. More generally, the concern
was expressed that although sovereign immunity was a defense to state law
claims in state court, it would be unavailable if the same matter were raised
against a state in a diversity suit in federal court.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 370.
In support of the notion that Article I did not override general state sovereignty,
Alexander Hamilton wrote in the Federalist Papers:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amendable to the suit of an
individual without its consent. This is the general sense, and the general practice
of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now
enjoyed by the government of every state in the union. Unless, therefore, there
is a surrender of this immunity... it will remain with the States....
THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 416-17 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 1987).
Discussing the contributions of Pennsylvania delegate James Wilson, Edward Elliot
stated: "Where is this power lodged? Certainly not in the constitutions, for we have just
seen that they may be changed at will by the people, in the citizens at large, and is para-
mount to all constitutions." EDWARD ELLIOT, BIOGRAPHICAL STORY OF THE
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Eleventh Amendment was created in response to the Supreme
Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia.Y In Chisholm, a South
Carolina citizen sold war supplies to the State of Georgia in 1777.6
When Georgia failed to honor the contract, Chisholm sought a de-
fault judgment in federal court." The Court held that the state-
citizen diversity clause of Article III supported Chisholm's cause of
action in federal court against the State of Georgia. 8 The House and
Senate reacted swiftly to Chisholm and passed the Eleventh
Amendment within four months. 9 The ambiguity of the Constitution
and the quick congressional reaction to Chisholm amplify the chief
concerns of sovereign immunity: the dual notions of state autonomy
and accountability.2 These concerns still pervade Eleventh Amend-
CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN UNION 68 (1910).
In response to this interpretation of Article III, Patrick Henry replied:
"If gentlemen pervert the most clear expressions, and the usual meaning of the
language of the people, there is an end of all argument. What says the paper?
That it shall have cognizance of controversies between a state and citizens of an-
other state, without discriminating between plaintiff and defendant. What says
the honorable gentleman? The contrary-that the state can only be plaintiff.
When the state is debtor, there is no reciprocity."
Gibbons, supra note 4, at 1906 (quoting Patrick Henry's response to Madison's broad
reading of Article II (quoting 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS
OF THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 490,543 (J. Elliot ed., 1941))).
15. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
16. See Stewart A. Baker, Federalism and the Eleventh Amendment, 48 U. COLO. L.
REv. 139, 141 (1977).
17. See id. at 141-42.
18. Four Justices wrote separately for the majority. There was one dissent. See id. at
142. For a thorough interpretation of Justice Iredell's dissent, see John V. Orth, The
Truth About Justice Iredell's Dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia (1793), 73 N.C. L. REV. 255
(1994).
19. See Baker, supra note 16, at 143 n.21. Within five years, the states ratified the
Eleventh Amendment. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 82-83 (1986); see also 12 MOORE ET
AL., supra note 5, 300.03[2] (discussing the timely reaction of the Congress and state
legislatures to the Court's decision in Chisholm).
20. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 368; see also 13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note
5, at § 3524 (indicating that the central factors in most state agency issues are the "degree
of autonomy of the governmental entity and whether recovery against [the entity] would
come from state funds"). Professor Chermerinsky puts forth three basic theories inter-
preting the Eleventh Amendment. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 374-75. The first
theory advocates that the Eleventh Amendment is a narrow portion of a broad limitation
on federal court jurisdiction. See id. Federal court jurisdiction is thus limited by the
states' broad power of sovereign immunity. See id. at 375-76. The second approach sug-
gests that the Eleventh Amendment restates the common-law doctrine of sovereign
immunity in existence before the adoption of the Constitution or the Eleventh Amend-
ment. See id. at 378. The third interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment argues that
the Amendment was only intended to limit diversity suits. See id. at 380. This theory
interprets the Amendment as addressing only the language in Article II, § 2 allowing for
"Controversies... between a State and Citizens of another state." Id.
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ment jurisprudence and underlie the Fourth Circuit's recent decision
in Gray v. Laws.2
This Note first summarizes the facts of Gray, and the determina-
tions of the district court.' Next, the Note discusses the basic
Eleventh Amendment doctrine introduced by the court in Gray as a
basis for their consideration of an "arm of the state" immunity ques-
tion.2' The Note then illustrates Gray's reliance on the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson
Corp.2 and its directions to the district court on remand.' In Hess,
the Supreme Court standardized the Eleventh Amendment consid-
erations for a multistate entity created pursuant to the Compact
Clause." Gray utilized this analysis in the context of a single entity
question.' To lay a foundation for Gray's analysis of the single entity
issue, the Note then reviews Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence and
discusses the broadening of this constitutional provision past its tex-
tual scope.2 The Note then evaluates the Fourth Circuit's reliance on
Hess and its restructuring of the sovereign immunity doctrine.29 Fi-
nally, the Note discusses the uncertainties of this new doctrine and
predicts the Fourth Circuit's use of this enabling analysis?
In Gray v. Laws,3 the Fourth Circuit considered an Eleventh
Amendment "arm of the state" issue in a case involving an employee
at a county health department. 2 John Gray worked at the Orange
County Health Department (OCHD) in North Carolina for eighteen
years as a sanitarian." In May 1990, the county dismissed Gray for
making improper sexual comments to women while on the job.'
These allegations were reported to Gray's superiors, Dan Reimer
21. 51 F.3d 426 (4th Cir. 1995).
22. See infra notes 31-51 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
24. 115 S. Ct. 394 (1994).
25. See infra notes 64-77 and accompanying text.
26. See Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 400-06; infra notes 102-14 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 78-120 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 121-46 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
31. 51 F.3d 426 (4th Cir. 1995).
32. See id at 428-29. In Gray, the court based much of its decision on Hess v. Port
Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 115 S. Ct. 394 (1994), which addressed Eleventh Amendment
immunity concerns relating to multistate entities created pursuant to the United States
Constitution's Interstate Compact Clause. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 3; infra note 93.




and Tony Laws. 5 Gray alleged, however, that Tony Laws and Dan
Reimer dismissed him in direct retaliation for allegations he made to
superiors regarding the mismanagement and unequal enforcement of
state sanitation laws."
Following his dismissal, Gray filed a Petition for Hearing with
the North Carolina Office of Administrative Hearings?7 The admin-
istrative law judge (ALJ) ruled that Gray had been improperly
dismissed without "just cause."'  In addition, the ALI determined
that the "on going confrontations" between Gray and his superiors
gave the complaints a suspicious tone.39  The AIl concluded that,
even assuming the truth of the sexual misconduct complaints, no ba-
sis existed for the dismissal.' The State Personnel Commission
(SPC) adopted the decision and recommended that Gray be rein-
stated to the OCHD.41
Using the discretion afforded to him under North Carolina law,
Reimer nevertheless refused to reinstate Gray.42 Gray appealed this
35. See id Tony Laws was the director of Environmental Health at the Orange
County Health Department, and was Gray's immediate supervisor from 1977 until his
dismissal in 1990. See Appellees' Brief at 1, Gray (No. 94-1608). Dan Reimer, the Direc-
tor of the Orange County Health Department, was the only person with the statutory
authority to terminate Gray's employment. See id.
The allegations were brought to the attention of Laws and Reimer in early 1990. See
Gray, 51 F.3d at 429. Jeff Ensminger, owner of a local catering establishment, told Laws
in early 1990 that Gray had made sexual comments to Ensmingers' wife during the course
of an inspection. See Appellees' Brief at 1, Gray (No. 94-1608). At a meeting between
Reimer and Ensminger on January 24, 1990, Reimer was informed of another incident
with a local caterer. See id A preliminary investigation of the matter was conducted by
Laws at the direction of Reimer. See Gray, 51 F.3d at 429. Following an interview of the
two women, Gray was placed on compulsory leave of absence with pay pending further
investigation of the sexual allegations. See id Gray testified in his own behalf at a formal
pre-dismissal conference. See i Following this inquiry, however, Reimer officially dis-
missed Gray. See id
36. See id. For a discussion of the alleged bias of Dan Reimer and Tony Laws, see
Appellant's Brief at 10-13, Gray (No. 94-1608).
37. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-37 (1993); Gray, 51 F.3d at 429; see also N.C. ADMIN.
CODE tit. XXVI, rr. 2A.0101 to .0701 (March & Apr. 1996) (summarizing the role of the
North Carolina Office of Administrative Hearings); id. rr 2B.0101 to .0204 (same); id. rr
2C.0101 to .0504 (same); N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. XXVI if. 1.0101 to .0202 (Nov. 1994)
(same); id. i. 3.0101 to .0208 (same).
38. See Gray, 51 F.3d at 429; N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. XXVI rr. 1.0100 to 0202 (Nov.
1994).
39. See i.
40. See i The administrative law judge determined that no basis existed to conclude
that Gray had used a position of authority to gain sexual favors. See id.
41. See id
42. See 1d; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-37(a) (1993).
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decision in North Carolina state court.43 The trial judge adopted the
SPC recommendation and issued a reinstatement order restoring
Gray to his former duties at OCHD. In response, Gray filed claims
against Orange County, OCHD, and Reimer and Laws (both in their
individual and official capacities) alleging violations of his federal
constitutional rights to free speech and due process under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.45 Using the district court's supplemental jurisdiction, he filed
state claims alleging violations of state constitutional rights, inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy." The
defendants then removed the case to federal court.47
The district court held that North Carolina local health depart-
ment officials act on behalf of the State of North Carolina and that
the Eleventh Amendment's immunity doctrine barred these claims.5
The district court dismissed all claims against Reimer and Laws in
their official capacity for lack of jurisdiction .0 The court also dis-
missed Gray's claims against Orange County and OCHD, asserting
that Orange County could not be held responsible for the actions of
state officers and that OCHD was not an entity capable of being sued
under North Carolina law." Summary judgment was granted in favor
of Reimer and Laws on all claims brought against them in their indi-
vidual capacity.51
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, Gray contended that OCHD was a county agency for pur-
poses of the Eleventh Amendment and therefore was not protected
by sovereign immunity. He further alleged that Reimer and Laws,
as employees of OCT-D, were county officials, who could be sued in
their official capacity in federal court. 3 Finally, he asserted that the
district court improperly granted summary judgment on the individ-
43. See Gray, 51 F.3d at 429.
44. See id at 429-30.
45. See id at 430.
46. See id
47. See Appellant's Brief at 4, Gray (No. 94-1608).
48. See Gray, 51 F.3d at 430.
49. See id.
50. See id; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-3A-34 (1995) (mandating the creation of
local health departments); § 130A-39(b) (controlling a local health board's discretion in
deviating from state rules); §§ 90A-4.1 to 4.2 (providing for state funding of local health







ual claims against Reimer and Laws.'
The Fourth Circuit, in a panel decision written by Judge Luttig,5
vacated and remanded the case for further consideration of the dis-
trict court's finding that the county officials were entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity." The Fourth Circuit also vacated and re-
manded the district court's determination regarding the claims
brought against OCHD and Orange County. 7 Similarly, the court
vacated and remanded the district court's determination concerning
the individual § 1983 and First Amendment claims against Reimer
and Laws5
The Fourth Circuit began its analysis by discussing the founda-
tions of the Eleventh Amendment and its application to state
agencies. 9  The court recognized that although the Eleventh
54. See id.
55. The three judge panel consisted of Circuit Judge Hall, Circuit Judge Luttig, and
United States District Court of South Carolina Judge Currie. See id. at 428.
56. See id at 439.
57. See id. The district court dismissed the claims against Orange County, reasoning
that the county could not be liable for the actions of state officials. See id. at 434 n.6. In
light of the Gray court's decision to vacate and remand the decision which found that
Reimer and Laws had acted on behalf of the state, the court vacated the district court's
dismissal of the claims against the county. See id. The Fourth Circuit also vacated the
dismissal of the claims against the Orange County Health Department "so that the district
court may reconsider the department's susceptibility to suit in light of our decision in
Avery v. County of Burke." Id. at 434 n.6 (citing Avery v. County of Burke, 660 F.2d 111
(4th Cir. 1981)).
58. See id. at 439. Gray alleged in his complaint that Reimer and Laws had
"intentionally" and "maliciously" retaliated against him in response to the complaints he
made to OCHD superiors. See id. He had complained about "capricious" and
"arbitrary" behavior by Reimer and Laws while enforcing North Carolina law. See id. at
429; see also supra note 36 and accompanying text (referring to the alleged bias of Reimer
and Laws).
The district court based its summary judgment decision on lack of support for Gray's
allegations against the defendants within the "voluminous" submissions countering the
motion for summary judgment. See Gray, 51 F.3d at 434. The Fourth Circuit concluded,
however, that Gray's deposition included sufficient testimony to warrant further district
court consideration of Gray's First Amendment claim. See id. In vacating and remanding
these specific individual claims against the defendants, the Fourth Circuit remarked that it
did "not intend to suggest in any way that summary judgment on this claim might not yet
be available." Id. The court did, however, reaffirm the district court's dismissal of the
due process claims against the county, OCHD, and Reimer and Laws in their official ca-
pacity. See id. at 434 n.6.
59. See id. at 430 (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664 (1974)). In Edelman,
the Supreme Court distinguished between prospective and retroactive relief. See Edel-
man. 415 U.S. at 664; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 396. In Edelman, the plaintiffs
brought suit for injunctive relief against the Commissioner of the Illinois Department of
Public Welfare, seeking to compel the state to comply with federal guidelines and to re-
turn funds previously withheld. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 655. The Edelman Court drew
an important distinction, holding that the Eleventh Amendment barred the retroactive
1996]
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Amendment, by its specific terms, only applies to suits brought
against a state by "Citizens of another State," the Supreme Court
has held consistently that the Amendment applies with equal force to
citizens within the defendant state."1 The court noted that the term
"State" within the Amendment has been expanded and the immunity
consequently broadened to encompass entities characterized as
"arms of the state."62 The court concluded its brief discussion of the
Amendment's foundation by elucidating the protection given state
officials in their official capacity.0
In order to answer the jurisdictional question in Gray, the
Fourth Circuit turned next to the distinction between the immunity
afforded to a state in federal court and the immunity denied to local
governmental agencies." As the basis for this analysis, the court
turned to the Supreme Court's decision in Hess v. Port Authority
Trans-Hudson Corp." While Gray dealt with Eleventh Amendment
immunity in the context of an "arm of the state" entity, Hess dealt
with a multistate entity formed pursuant to the Constitution's Com-
pact Clause.'
In analyzing the questions presented in Gray, the Fourth Circuit
drew a comparison between Gray and Hess, asserting that "the same
broad principles identified by the Court as relevant in the multi-state
claim but not the prospective claim. See id at 658-59. The retroactive claim, which would
require the state and not the individual to pay the withheld money, could not be com-
pelled by the federal court. See id at 676-77; see, e.g., Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85 (1982)
(barring an administrator's interpleader action in a suit between two states on the basis
that Edelman did not restrict the Eleventh Amendment's force only to private parties
seeking to impose liability which would be paid by state funds).
60. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
61. See Gray, 51 F.3d at 430 (citing Edelman, 415 U.S. at 662-63); see also Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890) (refusing to allow a private citizen to sue the state to
recover unpaid interest on state bonds); ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 19, at 85
(discussing the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment bar under various plaintiff sce-
narios).
62. See Gray, 51 F.3d at 430. The Eleventh Amendment bars suit when the state is
the defendant. See id Suits brought against agencies of the state are also barred, but
suits against political subdivisions of the state are not. See id at 431. The Supreme Court
has determined that a municipal corporation is a "person," pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1979), and suit may be brought in either state or federal court for violating the rights of
an individual. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). The
Court has also declined to extend Eleventh Amendment protection to school boards. See
Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,280-81 (1977).
63. See Gray, 51 F.3d at 430; infra note 89 and accompanying text (reviewing cases
discussing the Eleventh Amendment's application to state officer suits).
64. See Gray, 51 F.3d at 431.
65. See id; Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 115 S. Ct. 394,394 (1994).
66. See infra notes 93, 102-14 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 75
1996] THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 357
entity context apply also in determining whether, within a single
state, a governmental entity is 'state' or 'local' for purposes of the
Eleventh Amendment."6'7 Gray, as did Hess, determined that the
primary concerns for the Eleventh Amendment analysis are the pro-
tection of state treasuries and the respect for the sovereign nature of
the states in our union.' The court asserted that of these two con-
cerns, however, the core concern of the Eleventh Amendment is the
determination of the judgment's effect on the state treasury. 9
67. Gray, 51 F.3d at 431. Holding that the bistate entity principles were dispositive in
this case, the court noted that the multistate principles discussed in Hess formed the basis
for the Eleventh Amendment in general. See id. at 432. In Gray, the court identified
both the protection of state treasuries and the preservation of state sovereignty as inter-
ests protected by of the Eleventh Amendment. See id. at 431-32. The Fourth Circuit
asserted that Hess extracted these principles by reviewing court precedent concerning
whether an entity within a single state context is "an arm or alter ego of the state." Id
Gray referenced cases cited in Hess addressing the nature of state agencies as arms of the
state. See id. at 432 n.4. The Gray court also asserted that the Supreme Court's decision
to remand in Ristow v. South Carolina Ports Auth., 27 F.3d 84 (4th Cir.), vacated, 115 S.
Ct. 567 (1994), a Fourth Circuit case addressing a single-state entity question of Eleventh
Amendment immunity in light of Hess, provided further evidence of Hess' applicability to
the question presented in Gray. See Gray, 51 F.3d at 433.
68. See Gray, 51 F.3d at 432. The court noted the historical roots of these two con-
cerns. See id. First, the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment following the Supreme
Court's dubious opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), was largely
based on fear of state liability for federal war debt. Gray, 51 F.3d at 431. See generally
Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1467-73 (1987)
(discussing Chisholm and the concerns surrounding its deliberation). Next, the court
noted the deeper roots of the Eleventh Amendment-the relationship between the states
and the federal government and the individual autonomy of the states. See Gray, 51 F.3d
at 432; supra note 20 and accompanying text.
69. See Gray, 51 F.3d at 433. The Gray court also noted that "[t]he principal differ-
ences between the multistate and single state analyses appear to be that, in the former but
not the latter, a presumption against Eleventh Amendment immunity exists." Id. In the
context of a multistate entity, there is generally no threat to the integrity of state control
and the question of state control is generally a "perilous inquiry." Id. (citing Hess, 115 S.
Ct. at 404). Highlighting the unique nature of a multistate entity, the Hess Court noted:
An interstate compact, by its very nature, shifts a part of a state's authority to
another state or states, or to the agency that several states jointly create to run
the compact. Such an agency under the control of special interests or guberna-
torially appointed representatives is two or more steps removed from popular
control, or even of control by a local government.
Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 401 (citing MARIAN E. RIDGEWAY, INTERSTATE COMPACTS: A
QUESTION OF FEDERALISM 300 (1971)).
The Fourth Circuit also noted the uncertainty surrounding the Hess decision in the
application of these principles. See Gray, 51 F.3d at 433. The court rhetorically inquired
into what the analysis should be when the two principal factors (the state treasury ques-
tion and the state sovereignty question) point in the same or different directions. See id
Finally, the court asked how other "relevant" considerations, promulgated in Lake
Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979), fit into the
Eleventh Amendment analysis. See Gray, 51 F.3d at 433; infra note 100 and accompany-
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The Gray court then considered Hess' approach to Eleventh
Amendment analysis in light of its own precedent." The court as-
serted that the analysis of Hess did not deviate too far from Fourth
Circuit single-state entity jurisprudence. The Fourth Circuit had rec-
ognized, in the single state and "arm of the state" context, the
importance of judgments against the state treasury." The court rec-
ognized, however, that the Hess decision varied slightly from the
Fourth Circuit analysis, increasing the weight given to the state sov-
ereignty issue and moderately altering the factoring of other
"relevant considerations."
Finally, the court directed the district court's reconsideration of
the immunity questions in Gray on remand.Y The court outlined
North Carolina statutory provisions bearing on the determination of
whether "official capacity" judgments against Reimer and Laws
would be paid out of the state treasury.74 Interpreting the effect of
these laws on the instant case, the court indicated that "suits against
local health department officials will be paid out of local funds allo-
cated for that purpose."'75 Concerning the Eleventh Amendment
ing text.
70. See Gray, 51 F.3d at 434. While recognizing the similarities in these approaches,
the court commented on what it called "errors in the district court's understanding of [its]
precedent." ld. at 435; see infra notes 115-20 and accompanying text (discussing Bockes
v. County of Grayson, Va., 999 F.2d 788 (4th Cir. 1993), cert denied, 510 U.S. 1092
(1994)).
71. See Gray, 51 F.3d at 434.
72. See id; infra notes 136-50 and accompanying text.
73. See Gray, 51 F.3d at 435.
74. See id. at 435-36; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-300.3 (1993); id. § 143-300.6 (1993); id.
§ 143-300.8 (1993); id. § 90A-51(4)(c) (1992); id. § 153A-97 (1991); id. § 130A-4(b)
(1990); id. § 160A-167 (1987). Section 143-300.8 reads:
Any local health department sanitarian enforcing rules of the Commission for
Health Services under the supervision of the Department of Environment,
Health, and Natural Resources pursuant to G.S. 130A-4(b) shall be defended by
the Attorney General, subject to the provisions of G.S. 143-300.4, and shall be
protected from liability in accordance with the provisions of this Article in any
liability in any civil or criminal action or proceeding brought against the sani-
tarian in his official or individual capacity, or both, on account of an act done or
omission made in the scope and course of enforcing the rules of the Commission
for Health Services. The Department of Environment, Health, and Natural Re-
sources shall pay any judgment against the sanitarian, or any settlement made on
his behalf, subject to the provisions of G.S. 143.300.6.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-300.8 (1993), quoted in Gray, 51 F.3d at 435-36.
75. Gray, 51 F.3d at 436. The court outlined four reasons for drawing the conclusion
that local funds would pay any judgment against Reimer or Laws. See id. First, Reimer
and Laws did not appear to qualify as "sanitarians" under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90(A)-
51(4)(c) (1992). See Gray, 51 F.3d at 436. Section 90A-51(4)(c) specifies that
"sanitarians" is not inclusive of "public health officer[s] [and] public health department
director[s]." Gray, 51 F.3d at 436 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90A-51(4)(c) (1992)). Sec-
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immunity status of the OCHD, the court took a more cautious path
of analysis. It outlined a series of statutory provisions indicating both
state and county control of governmental control, summarily con-
cluding that the OCHD seemed to rest under county control for the
purposes of an Eleventh Amendment inquiry.76 Further directing the
course of the district court's reconsideration of the case, the Gray
court disputed the district court's conclusion that the North Carolina
appellate court's determinations regarding the characterization of the
local health department should be determinative in this analysis.'
Sovereign immunity jurisprudence determines the extent of the
Eleventh Amendment's limitation on federal court jurisdiction. His-
torically, this doctrine has been instrumental in defining and
illuminating the delicate balance of state and federal government
rights.78 In 1890, the Supreme Court in Hans v. Louisianda consid-
ond, the court concluded that pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-4(b) (1990), neither
Laws nor Reimer were "enforcing the rules of the Commission [for Health Services]."
Gray, 51 F.3d at 436. The court concluded that Reimer and Laws made employment de-
cisions "which seemingly have nothing to do with the activities covered by section 130A-
4(b)." Id Third, the court noted that neither Reimer nor Laws engaged "in the scope
and course of enforcing the rules of the Commission of Health Services" as required by
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-300.8. Gray, 51 F.3d at 436. Finally, the court noted that North
Carolina does not list a general statute covering judgments against local health depart-
ment employees acting in their official capacities. See id. Because statutes already
provide for payments of judgments against state employees, there would have been no
need to enact § 143-300.8 unless local health department officials were not covered gen-
erally. See id.
76. See id at 436-37. For statutes cited by the court in Gray that suggest counties are
largely responsible for the creation and operation of local departments of health, see N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 130-39(a) (1995); id. § 130A-34(b); id § 130A-35(a), (b), (g); id § 130A-
41(c); id § 153A-149(c)(13) (1991). But see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90A-50 (1992)
(authorizing the creation of the State Board of Sanitation Examiners and registration of
sanitarians in North Carolina); id § 130A-34 (1995) (mandating that counties regulate
and manage public health services organizations); id § 130A-39(b) (indicating that local
board of health may enact more stringent rules where necessary).
77. See Gray, 51 F.3d at 437. In section IV of its opinion, the Gray court affirmed the
district court's determination regarding Gray's § 1983 due process claims. See id at 438.
Gray contended that his due process rights were violated as a result of his employer's
evasion of state procedural guidelines. See id The court recognized, however, a distinc-
tion between state and federal procedures for due process violations. See id. Federal due
process claims are measured against the federal standard and state procedures cannot
dictate the process due the individual under the Constitution. See id (citing Riccio v.
County of Fairfax, 907 F.2d 1459, 1469 (4th Cir. 1990)). The court concluded that, under
the federal standard, Gray received both the required notice and an opportunity to re-
spond. See id.; see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985)
(noting that a state satisfies the Constitution's due process requirement in terminating an
employee by providing notice of the proposed deprivation and a pre-deprivation oppor-
tunity to respond).
78. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 368.
79. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
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ered the extent of federal jurisdiction in light of the Eleventh
Amendment's textual provisions.'o Hans concerned a Louisiana resi-
dent who sued the State of Louisiana in federal court for payment of
money owed under state-issued bonds and coupons.8 The Court held
that a state citizen could not sue his home state in federal court for
failing to pay off state bonds under the Contracts Clause." The Court
reasoned that suit brought by a citizen of the defendant state in fed-
eral court "was not contemplated by the Constitution when
establishing the judicial power of the United States."" In its analysis,
the Court reasoned that if the Eleventh Amendment forbade suits by
80. See ad at 9; see also North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U.S. 22, 30 (1890) (holding
that a citizen of North Carolina could not pursue a suit against the auditor of the State of
North Carolina). Following the Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
419 (1793), and the passage of the Eleventh Amendment, history witnessed a shadowy
departure of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence by the Supreme Court. See Orth, supra
note 18, at 256-57. In the 1880s, the Eleventh Amendment reappeared in state bond cases
in which citizens sought to compel the payment of bonds defaulted on by states. See id. at
257 ("Like the biblical bondholder who knows how to bring forth from his storeroom
things old and new, the Supreme Court retrieved the Eleventh Amendment."). Finally, in
the Court's centennial year, it squarely addressed the Eleventh Amendment concerns in
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
81. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 1. For a detailed discussion of the facts surrounding this
case, see JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 27 (1987).
82. Hans, 134 U.S. at 15. In fact, the Court noted: "The supposition that it would is
almost an absurdity on its face." Id The Supreme Court has repeatedly held against a
state's citizens wishing to pursue claims against their own state in federal court. See
Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 683 n.17 (1982); Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 28 (1933). Recent
Supreme Court Justices have criticized the Hans Court's liberal reading of the Eleventh
Amendment and the ever-broadening scope of the immunity doctrine. See Hess v. Port
Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 115 S. Ct. 394, 407 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[S]ince
Hans v. Louisiana, the Court has interpreted the Eleventh Amendment as injecting broad
notions of sovereign immunity into the whole corpus of federal jurisdiction."); Welch v.
Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(dissenting for four separate reasons, among them being his belief that the Eleventh
Amendment applies only to diversity suits and not admiralty or federal question suits);
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 302 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("I[T]he doctrine that has been created is pernicious. In an era when sovereign immunity
has generally been recognized by courts and legislatures as an anachronistic and unneces-
sary remnant of the feudal legal system.... the Court has aggressively expanded its
scope.").
83. Hans, 134 U.S. at 15; see Fletcher, supra note 2, at 103940 (noting that while the
Court in Hans was careful to explain that the explicit wording of the Constitution does
not mention the type of suit involved in Hans, other Court holdings have been more lib-
eral in their interpretation of Eleventh Amendment terms). Some commentators have
openly criticized the liberal interpretation of the Hans Court. See, e.g., Amar, supra note
68, at 1476 ("If coherence of general sovereign immunity doctrine is achieved only by
mangling the Amendment's text, the obvious lesson should be that the Amendment was
not designed to embody any such doctrine.").
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out-of-state citizens, it was difficult to imagine that in-state residents
would be free to sue their home state.' The Court considered it
"anomalous" to allow such an interpretation of the Constitution.8
The Court has also stretched the doctrine of Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity to include "state" officers. In Ford Motor Co. v.
Department of Treasury of the State of Indiana," the Court again
utilized the Amendment to protect the state treasuryY In this case,
Ford Motor Company sued the State of Indiana, the governor, the
state treasurer, and the state auditor to recover a refund of state in-
come taxesY The Court held that regardless of whether the state is a
named party, the Eleventh Amendment shields state officers acting
in their official capacity. 9 The Indiana statute upon which the peti-
84. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 15. The Court stated:
The letter [of the Constitution] is appealed to now, as it was then, as a ground
for sustaining a suit brought by an individual against a State. The reason against
it is as strong in this case as it was in that. It is an attempt to strain the Constitu-
tion and the law to a construction never imagined or dreamed of. Can we
suppose that, when the Eleventh Amendment was adopted, it was understood to
be left open for citizens of a State to sue their own state in the federal courts,
whilst the idea of suits by citizens of other states, or of foreign states, was indig-
nantly repelled? Suppose that Congress, when proposing the Eleventh
Amendment, had appended to it a proviso that nothing therein contained should
prevent a State from being sued by its own citizens in cases arising under the
Constitution or laws of the United States: can we imagine that it would have
been adopted by the States?
Id See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 232 (1995) (discussing the
Court's decision in Hans as an example of liberal judicial activism).
85. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 18.
86. 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
87. See id. at 464 ("And when the action is in essence one for the recovery of money
from the state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke
its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal defen-
dants." (citations omitted)). See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 394 (citing
Ford and the general doctrine involving suits against state officers).
88. See Ford, 323 U.S. at 460.
89. See id. at 464. For a thorough discussion of the Eleventh Amendment's applica-
tion to state officer suits, see 13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 5, § 3524; 12 MOORE ET AL.,
supra note 5, 300.03[4]. The Court in Ford noted, "[W]hen the action is in essence one
for the recovery of money from the state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest
and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials
are nominal defendants." Ford, 323 U.S. at 464 (citing Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436
(1900) and Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944)). The Court countered this,
however, by acknowledging that "where relief is sought under general law from wrongful
acts of state officials, the sovereign's immunity under the Eleventh Amendment does not
extend to wrongful individual action, and the citizen is allowed a remedy against the
wrongdoer personally." Id at 462 (citing Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
O'Connor, 223 U.S. 280 (1912)).
In Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985), the Court sought to define more clearly
"the distinction between personal and official-capacity suits." Id. at 165. The Court ruled
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tioner relied lacked an express statement of unequivocal intent to
submit to suit in federal court.' Finding that the immunity doctrine
of the Eleventh Amendment acts as an absolute bar when private
litigants seek to recover from the state treasury, the Supreme Court
dismissed the auto-maker's suit for recovery of income tax payment.91
In 1979, however, the Court refused to extend Eleventh
Amendment immunity to a bistate entity in Lake Country Estates,
that official-capacity suits represent "only another way of pleading an action against an
entity of which an officer is an agent." Id. at 165-66 (quoting Monell v. New York City
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,690 n.55 (1978)); see Brunken v. Lance, 807 F.2d 1325,
1329 (7th Cir. 1986); Foulks v. Ohio Dep't of Rehabilitation & Corrections, 713 F.2d
1229, 1233 (6th Cir. 1983). In a personal capacity suit, the entity is not the real party in
interest, and the award for damages can be executed solely on the personal assets of the
actor. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 166. The purpose of the Eleventh Amendment is to pro-
tect state treasuries and not individual actors. See Ford, 323 U.S. at 464-65. Thus, in
analyzing the distinction, the inquiry must begin by determining whether the suit is
brought against the assets of the entity. Cf Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26 (1991)
(indicating the importance of the treasury determination by noting "the phrase 'acting in
their official capacities' is best understood as a reference to the capacity in which the state
officer is sued, not the capacity in which the officer inflicts the alleged injury").
State indemnification policies are not relevant to the consideration of Eleventh
Amendment issues. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 394. A state officer cannot seek
the protection of the Eleventh Amendment when a state statute requires that the state
indemnify the officer with funds from the state treasury. See id.
The Supreme Court has also held that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits
brought against state officers for injunctive relief. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 149-
54 (1908). In Young, the Court held that litigants may enjoin the actions of state officers
in violation of federal law. See iL at 156, 159-60; see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Flor-
ida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1133 (1996) (determining that the "narrow exception" of Ex Parte
Young did not extend to suits against state officials initiated pursuant to the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act); Home Tel. & Tel. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 288-89 (1913)
(determining that, although the individual conduct of state officers is not entitled to sov-
ereign immunity protection, the conduct is still state action for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
90. See Ford, 323 U.S. at 465. "Th[e] express constitutional limitation [within the
Eleventh Amendment] denies federal courts the authority to entertain a suit brought by
private parties against a state without its consent." Id. at 464 (citing Hans v. Louisiana,
134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 25 (1933); Ex Parte New York, 256
U.S. 490,497 (1921)); see Kentucky v. Graham 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985). Quoting Great
Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54 (1944), the Ford Court stated:
"'When a state authorizes a suit against itself to do justice to taxpayers who deem them-
selves injured by any exaction, it is not consonant with our dual system for the federal
courts to be astute to read the consent to embrace federal as well as state courts .... '"
Ford, 323 U.S. at 465.
91. See id. at 464,470. Concluding its opinion, the Ford Court remarked:
The advantage of having state courts pass initially upon questions which involve
the state's liability for tax refunds is illustrated by the instant case where peti-
tioner sued in a federal court for a refund only to urge on certiorari that the




Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency." Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency (TRPA), a California and Nevada creation pursuant to the
Compact Clause,93 regulated conservation and recreational planning
in the Lake Tahoe Basin resort area.94 The petitioners filed suit in
federal court under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,' alleging
that TRPA, its executive officer, and members of the governing
board had substantially diminished the value of their property.96
The Supreme Court rejected the lower courts' rulings and denied
TRPA Eleventh Amendment immunity.' The Court determined
92. 440 U.S. 391, 402 (1979).
93. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. The provision states:
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep
Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact
with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually
invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.
Id.
94. See Lake Country, 440 U.S. at 391. The Lake Tahoe Basin is a unique area famed
for its scenic beauty and recreational opportunities. See icL at 393 n.2. The Tahoe Re-
gional Planning Agency (TRPA) compact was formed by California and Nevada in 1968
to better regulate the development of this area while conserving its natural resources and
physical wonder. See id at 394. In 1969, as required by the Constitution's Compact
Clause, Congress approved the formation of this entity. See if.
95. The petitioners claimed federal subject matter jurisdiction on two theories. See
id at 394-95. First, they alleged that the violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments gave rise to an implied cause of action. See id at 395 (citing Bivens v. Six
Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)). Second, the petitioners asserted
that the TRPA acted "under color of state law," implicating 42 U.S.C. § 1983, thereby
basing jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. § 1343. See Lake Country, 440 U.S. at 395.
The district court dismissed the complaint against TRPA, the director, and the gov-
erning board. See Jacobsen v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 387 F. Supp. 429, 439 (D.
Nev. 1975), affd, 566 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Lake Country Estates, Inc.
v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979). Although it concluded that the
plaintiff had sufficiently alleged a case of inverse condemnation, it ruled that TRPA had
no authority to condemn property. See id. The district court further concluded that the
officers were immune from liability for the exercise of discretionary functions. See id.
Although the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the
complaint against TRPA, it reinstated the complaint against the individual respondents.
See Jacobsen v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 566 F.2d 1353, 1367 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd
sub noma. Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391
(1979). The Ninth Circuit concluded, however, that the congressional approval required
by the Compact Clause transformed TRPA into a federal law entity which denied the
plaintiffs the right to invoke the color of state law doctrine pursuant to §§ 1343 and 1983.
See iiL at 1358. Finally, the Ninth Circuit found that the Eleventh Amendment immu-
nized TRPA from suit in federal court, and that the individuals were afforded qualified
immunity for executive action and absolute immunity for action of a legislative character.
See I at 1365. The court did, however, find an implied right of action under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments actionable under § 1331. See id
at 1364.
96. See Lake Country, 440 U.S. at 396.
97. See Ia at 402,406.
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that, although it had protected some agencies exercising state
power," it had nevertheless "consistently refused to construe the
Amendment to afford protection to political subdivisions."99 In its
analysis of whether TRPA could claim Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity, the Court considered a list of six factors."e The Court concluded
that TRPA, its responsibilities more closely resembling that of a local
government than that of a state, could not receive Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity.10
1
Most recently, in Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp.,02
the Court was called upon again to determine whether the Eleventh
Amendment protects a bistate entity created pursuant to the Com-
pact Clause from suit in federal court. In Hess, two Port Authority
Trans-Hudson Corporation (PATH)"° workers brought suit in fed-
98. See id. at 400-01 (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Ford Motor Co.
v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945)).
99. Id. at 400-01 (citing Mount Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280-81
(1985); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 717-21 (1973); Lincoln County v. Lun-
ing, 133 U.S. 529,530 (1890)). The Court concluded that immunity could not be extended
absent a good reason to believe that the states intended the bistate entity to "enjoy the
special constitutional protection of the States." Id. at 401. Both states in the instant case
filed briefs denying this intent to provide immunity. See id
100. See id at 401-02. The Court considered:
(1) the characterization of the entity by the language of its creating statutes; (2)
the origin of the entity's funding; (3) whether the state is financially responsible
for the liabilities and obligations incurred by the entity; (4) the source of the
power to appoint the entity's officers or members; (5) whether the function per-
formed by the entity is traditionally state or municipal; (6) and whether the
entity's actions are subject to a veto by the state.
Id The Fourth Circuit clarified and itemized these factors in Ristow v. South Carolina
Ports Authority, 58 F.3d 1051,1052 (4th Cir. 1995).
101. See Lake Country, 440 U.S. at 401.
102. 115 S. Ct. 394 (1995). Justice Ginsburg wrote for the majority, joined by Justices
Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer. See id at 397. Justice Stevens filed a concurring
opinion. See iL at 407 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting
opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Thomas and Scalia. See id at 408
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Hess see Jennifer A. Winking, Note, Elev-
enth Amendment: A Move Towards Simplicity in the Test for Immunity, 60 Mo. L. REv.
953 (1995) (discussing the Court's decision in Hess); Adam Adrignolo, Eleventh Amend-
ment-Sovereign Immunity-Bistate Railway, The Port Authority Trans-Hudson
Corporation Is Not Entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity From Suit in Federal
Court-Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 63 U.S.L.W. 4009 (Nov. 14, 1994), 5
SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 809 (1995) (same). See generally David Lightman, Workers
Can Sue: Multistate Agency Ruling Could Hurt State's Rights, THE HARTFORD COURANT,
Nov. 15, 1994, at Al (discussing the states' rights concerns of the Court's decision in
Hess).
103. PATH, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey, operates a commuter railroad connecting New York City with northern New Jer-
sey. Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 397.
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eral court claiming a right to compensation under the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act (FELA),' a federal law governing injuries to
railroad workers."0 5 Both the district court and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected the complaints on the
ground that PATH was an agency of the state and entitled to the im-
munity afforded by the Eleventh Amendment."' The Supreme Court
104. Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1994); see also Parden v. Ter-
minal Ry. of the Ala. State Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (holding that the State
of Alabama waived its sovereign immunity and right to object to suit under Federal Em-
ployer's Liability Act when it approved § 8 of Article I of the Constitution, which gives
Congress the right to regulate interstate commerce), overruled in part by Welch v. Texas
Highway & Pub. Transp. Dep't, 483 U.S. 468,476-78 (1987).
In Welch, the Court ruled that Congress must unmistakably make clear that waiver
took effect for states to lose Eleventh Amendment protection. In Hilton v. South Caro-
lina Public Railways Commission, 502 U.S. 197 (1991), the Court stated that Parden was
overruled only with respect to Eleventh Amendment protection. Id at 204-05. States
could still be sued under FELA in state court. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116
S. Ct. 1114, 1132 (1996) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment prevents Congress from
authorizing suits by Native American tribes against states for prospective injunctive relief
in order to enforce legislation passed pursuant to Indian Commerce Clause).
The Court has, however, found that states may be sued in federal court pursuant to
Congress's power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427
U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (finding "the Eleventh, and the principle of state sovereignty which it
embodies are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment") (citation omitted). With respect to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, though, the Court
determined that Congress did not express that the statute warranted state amenability to
suit, even though the statute was passed pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332,345 (1979).
Both Hess and Walsh filed their federal complaints within the three-year statute of
limitations period required pursuant to the FELA. See Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 397. Neither
Hess nor Walsh, however, filed within the one-year statue of limitations period indicated
within the states' statutory consent to sue PATH. See id. at 397 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 32:1-157, 32:1-163 (West 1990); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW §§ 7101, 7107 (McKinney
1979)).
105. See id. The workers, Albert Hess and Charles Walsh, were injured in unrelated
accidents. See id. Hess asserted that while working on a train engine, "the window in said
train malfunctioned and struck [his] right hand." Hess v. Port. Auth. Trans-Hudson
Corp., 809 F. Supp. 1172, 1174 (D.N.J. 1992), affd, 8 F.3d 811 (3rd Cir. 1993), rev'd and
remanded, 115 S. Ct. 394 (1994). Walsh claimed his injury occurred when a passenger
train door slammed shut on his right wrist and arm. See Walsh v. Port. Auth. Trans-
Hudson Corp., 813 F. Supp. 1095, 1096 (D.N.J.) , affd, 8 F.3d 811 (3rd Cir. 1993), rev'd
and remanded, 115 S. Ct. 394 (1994).
106. See Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 398. In line with Third Circuit precedent, Port Authority
Police Benevolent Association, Inc. v. Port Authority of N.Y. & N.J., 819 F.2d 413 (3d Cir.
1987), the district court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint and held that PATH's Elev-
enth Amendment immunity precluded suit in federal court past the one-year period to
which the states of New Jersey and New York consented. See Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 398.
Incidentally, the district court noted an interesting anomaly: "Had Hess sued in New
Jersey or New York state court the FELA's 3-year limitation period, not the States' 1-year
prescription, would have applied." Id. The Third Circuit consolidated the dismissals and
affirmed the district court's decisions that PATH, an agency of the state for Eleventh
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granted certiorari to further clarify the issues involved in Eleventh
Amendment treatment of multistate agencies.'07 The Court reversed
and held that a wholly-owned subsidiary of a financially independent
bistate entity was not entitled to immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment.1' 8
The Court reasoned that when the traditional indicators of im-
munity point in different directions," the analysis must turn to the
primary motivations for the Eleventh Amendment: the promotion of
federal-state comity and the insulation of state treasuries from judg-
ment."0 The Court concluded, first, that suit in federal court would
not be disrespectful to either state as an independent body and that
the federal courts did not possess an "alien" interest.'' Having de-
Amendment purposes, was entitled to immunity and that judgments against the entity
would be paid from the states' coffers.
107. See Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 397. The Court granted certiorari in order to resolve a
discrepancy between the Third and Second Circuits regarding PATH's status as a bistate
entity. See id. at 399-400. While the Third Circuit had found PATH protected by the
Eleventh Amendment, the Second Circuit in Feeney v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson
Corp., 873 F.2d 628, 631 (2d Cir. 1989), aff'd, 495 U.S. 299 (1990), determined that PATH
was not a state agency. See Schecter, supra note 13, at 439 n.29.
Other courts have reached different determinations regarding multistate entities.
Compare Kozikowski v. Delaware River Port Auth., 397 F. Supp. 1115, 1120 (D.N.J.
1984) (denying immunity on waiver grounds), and, Heffez v. Washington Metro. Area
Transit Auth., 569 F. Supp. 1551, 1556 (D.D.C. 1983) (denying Eleventh Amendment
immunity to the defendant multistate entity) with Clarke v. Washington Metro. Area
Transit Auth., 654 F. Supp. 712, 714-15 (D.D.C. 1986) (upholding two previous determi-
nations that an entity created by the District of Columbia, Virginia and Maryland had
immunity).
108. See Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 406.
109. See id at 404. These "traditional indicators of immunity" refer to the considera-
tions outlined in Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391,
402 (1979). See supra note 100 (listing factors).
110. See Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 404. Although Hess involved a bistate entity, similar to
Lake Country, the Hess Court distinguished this prior precedent. See id. at 402. The
Court in Hess noted that the relevant considerations of Lake Country "d[id] not ... all
point the same way." IL
Although PATH acted under largely local control, each state, acting independently,
possessed the power to veto PATH measures or enlarge PATH responsibilities. See id. at
402-03. Furthermore, while the legislative language did not describe PATH as a "state
agency," state courts had categorized PATH as an agency of the state. See id. at 403
(citing Whalen v. Wagner, 152 N.E.2d 54, 56-57 (N.Y. 1958)). The Court also noted that
New York and New Jersey lack financial responsibility for the entity and, more impor-
tantly, "[t]he States ... bear no legal liability for Port Authority debts." Id The Court in
Hess recognized "the prevention of federal court judgments that must be paid out of a
State's treasury" as the "most salient factor" of Eleventh Amendment analysis and the
"impetus" for the Amendment's creation. Id. at 404.
111. See id. at 401. The Court gave three reasons for this conclusion. First, the Court
reasoned that "the federal court, in relation to [a Compact Clause] enterprise, is hardly
the instrument of a distant, disconnected sovereign; rather, the federal court is ordained
by one of the entity's founders." ld. Second, the Court determined that states' integrity
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cided this issue, the Court then asked whether a good reason existed
to believe that Congress and the states intended PATH to possess
Eleventh Amendment immunity.2  In order to decide this issue, the
Court "home[d] in on the impetus for the Eleventh Amendment: the
prevention of federal court judgments that must be paid out of a
State's treasury.""1 Bolstering this argument, the Court reviewed an
expansive list of single-state-entity circuit court holdings asserting the
supremacy of the state treasury determination. 4 The Fourth Circuit
has taken a similar analytical approach to the Eleventh Amendment
by focusing both on federalism and treasury protection.
The Fourth Circuit addressed the question of Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity in Bockes v. County of Grayson, Virginia. In
Bockes, the former Director of the Grayson County Department of
Social Services (GDSS) brought suit against the county, GDSS, and
was not compromised because, under the terms of the Compact, "the States agreed to the
power sharing, coordination, and unified action that typify" these relationships. Id Fi-
nally, the Court concluded that the federal court cannot be looked upon as an alien entity
because the suits arise out of a federal law. See idt
112. See id at 403.
113. I& at 404.
114. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. In dissent, Justice O'Connor attacked
the majority for creating what she saw as a per se rule against the application of the Elev-
enth Amendment to bistate entities. See Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 408 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). Justice O'Connor disapproved of the Court's conclusions concerning the
effect on the state's integrity and the change in the Court's view of the factors utilized in
Lake Country, 440 U.S. at 402, to determine arm-of-the-state status. See Hess, 115 S. Ct.
at 408 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Concerning this second proposition, Justice O'Connor criticized the majority's reli-
ance on the treasury factor in the determination of the arm-of-the-state issue. See id at
409-12 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Although Justice O'Connor acknowledged the circuit
court's general favor with this factor, she concluded that an exclusive analysis, centered
on the treasury factor, was "erroneous" and misguided. See id. at 410 (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting) (citing Benning v. Board of Regents of Regency Univs., 928 F.2d 775, 777 (7th
Cir. 1991); Puerto Rico Ports Auth. v. M/V Manhattan Prince, 897 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir.
1990)). Justice O'Connor argued that the majority had transformed a "sufficient" condi-
tion for immunity into a "necessary" condition. See id at 410 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Further, she contended that the text of the Amendment itself stood against the majority's
holding. See id (O'Connor, J., dissenting). While Justice O'Connor recognized the
"sufficiency" of the state treasury factor, she refused to find it dispositive. See idt at 410
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor thought that "the proper question is
whether the State possesses sufficient control over an entity performing governmental
functions that the entity may properly be called an extension of the state." Id
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor asserted, in keeping with the federalist
viewpoint, that this inquiry more clearly respects the sovereign integrity of the states. See
ia. at 411 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor concluded by remarking that, in
the instant case, the state governments exercised sufficient control over PATH to warrant
Eleventh Amendment immunity. See id. at 411-12 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
115. 999 F.2d 788 (4th Cir. 1993).
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the Grayson County Board of Social Services (Board)."6 The district
court found the Board and GDSS immune from suit under the Elev-
enth Amendment, but held the county responsible under § 1983 for
personnel decisions of the Board.1 7 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the
district court's reasoning that the action was "in essence one for the
recovery of money from the state.... The court rejected Bockes' ar-
guments that other relevant considerations, such as the state's
characterization of the entity, the extent of state control, or the
agency's dependence upon the state, should control the determina-
tion of the Eleventh Amendment question."' Concerning the county,
the court held that the Board acted pursuant to state-prescribed
standards, thus securing the county's Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity.12
In suits against government entities, Eleventh Amendment in-
quiry seeks to determine whether entities with both state and local
116. See id. at 788. For a thorough discussion of the facts of Bockes, see Bockes v.
Fields, 798 F. Supp. 1219, 1221 (W.D. Va. 1992), modified, 999 F.2d 788 (4th Cir. 1993),
cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994). For 13 years, Nancy Bockes served as the Director of
the Grayson County Department of Social Services. See Bockes, 999 F.2d at 789. In June
1990, she was fired without notice. See id After a grievance proceeding, she was rein-
stated and granted one-half of her backpay. See id Dissatisfied with this award, she filed
a § 1983 action against the department, the county, and the individual members of the
board in both their individual and official capacities. See id
117. See id The district court, accepting an Eleventh Amendment immunity argu-
ment, granted judgment as a matter of law for the board (both in their official and
individual capacities) and the department. See Bockes v. Fields, 798 F. Supp. 1219, 1222-
24 (W.D. Va. 1992), modified, 999 F.2d 788 (4th Cir. 1993) (affirming the Board and De-
partment's immunity and reversing County's liability), cert denied, 510 U.S. 1092 (1994).
The district court found for the plaintiff with respect to the County, however, and
awarded her damages. See id at 1224-26.
118. Bockes, 999 F.2d at 790 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323
U.S. 459, 464 (1945) (citations omitted)). "It is also well established that this immunity
extends to state agencies and officials, when a monetary judgment against them would be
paid from the state treasury." Id. The Fourth Circuit determined that sovereign immu-
nity would extend to the County Health Board because a "substantial portion" of the
judgment would be paid from state funds. See id The court determined that 80% of the
district court's judgment would come from the Virginia treasury. See id
119. Id (citing Keller v. Prince George's County, 827 F.2d 952, 964 (4th Cir. 1987);
Ram Ditta v. Maryland Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n, 822 F.2d 456, 457-58 (4th
Cir. 1987)). The court asserted that the determination of the money damages from the
state treasury is the threshold question in an "arm of the state" analysis. See id. at 791.
When this inquiry does not provide clear guidance, however, these alternative factors
may be considered to determine the immunity of the entity. See id
120. See id The court observed that in the Commonwealth of Virginia, authority is
reserved for the State Board of Health to set "general goals and programs" for social
services personnel. See id ("[T]he Grayson County Board enjoyed its discretion to fire




characteristics constitute an "arm of the state.'' In answering this
question in the context of a county health department and its em-
ployees, Gray v. Laws sought the guidance of recent Supreme Court
precedent.m While Gray acknowledged Hess' pronouncement of the
"significantly different position in our federal system that multi-state
entities occupy,"m it determined that the same general principles ap-
plicable in the Compact Clause context could be extended to the
situation in Gray. The court, however, struggled to explain the
similarities in light of Hess' strong emphasis on the differences.'m
The Hess Court made clear statements differentiating the mul-
tistate from the single-state entity situation." In Hess, the Court
viewed the bistate entity as existing outside of the twin concerns of
the Eleventh Amendment: the sovereign dignity of the states and the
protection of states from suit in federal court.tm In light of this, the
Court asserted that a presumption against Eleventh Amendment
immunity exists in the multistate entity analysis, something the Court
has never asserted in an individual state context.'6 Furthermore, the
Court accentuated the structural differences between a compact en-
tity and a single-state entity analyzed pursuant to an "arm of the
state" determination. 9 Finally, the Hess Court followed the lan-
121. See Gray, 51 F.3d at 431.
122. See id, at 431-35; supra notes 102-14 and accompanying text.
123. Gray, 51 F.3d at 431 (quoting Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 400).
124. See id. at 431-35.
125. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
126. See Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 400-02. Justice Ginsburg stated: "Bistate entities occupy a
significantly different position in our federal system than do the States themselves. The
States, as separate sovereigns, are the constituent elements of the Union. Bistate entities,
in contrast, typically are creations of three discrete sovereigns: two States and the federal
government." IL at 400 (citing VINCENTV. THURSBY, INTERSTATE COOPERATION: A
STUDY OF THE INTERSTATE COMPACT (1953)).
127. See id.; supra note 20 and accompanying text. The Court emphasized the national
interest involved in the Compact Clause entity. See Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 400. Quoting West
Virginia ex reL Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 27 (1951), the Court noted that a compact" 'is
more than a supple device for dealing with interests confined within a region... . [I]t is
also means of safeguarding the national interest....'" Id. at 401; see also Virginia v.
Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519-20 (1893) (requiring congressional consent of an agreement
tending to increase the political power of the states, which may encroach upon or inter-
fere with the supremacy of the United States).
128. See Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 402.
129. See id. at 400-01. As entities requiring congressional approval, multistate entities
address "interests and problems that do not coincide nicely either with the national
boundaries or with State lines." See id. at 400 (quoting THURSBY, supra note 126, at 5);
see also Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-
A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 697-98 (1925) (discussing the neces-
sity of PATH's creation under the Compact Clause); Frank P. Grad, Federal-State
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guage of the Eleventh Amendment, limiting sovereign immunity to
"one of the United States," thus further enhancing the differences in
the two situations.'
The Fourth Circuit, notwithstanding the strong differences prof-
fered in Hess, brought multistate analysis within Hess' reach by
emphasizing the Eleventh Amendment's foundations. According to
Gray, the concerns underlying Eleventh Amendment sovereign im-
munity are common regardless of the entity analyzed and differences
in structure should not limit courts from drawing support from the
basic Eleventh Amendment framework set down in Hess.131  Al-
though the Fourth Circuit recognized that "[i]t is impossible to glean
from the [Supreme] Court's opinion in Hess the precise differences
between the analyses governing multi-state entities and single state
entities," the court asserted that the core values recognized in Hess
sprang from cases addressing single-state entity questions." In dis-
missing the differences between the multistate and single-state entity,
the Gray court gave itself the opportunity to draw all that it needed
and wanted from the Hess analysis.
Having concluded that the fundamentals set forth in Hess would
Compact: A New Experiment in Co-Operative Federalism, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 825, 854-
55 (1963) (commenting that states will not succeed in the eradication of regional problems
"if they regard compacts ... as an affirmation of a narrow concept of state sovereignty.
They may succeed if, along with the assertion of legitimate interests of their own, they
regard their role as historic, independently functioning parts of a regional polity and of a
national union").
130. See Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 402 (quoting Lake Country, 440 U.S. 391, 400 (1979)).
Although the Court acknowledged that sovereign immunity protection has sometimes
been extended to "arm of the state" actors when the suit jeopardized the state treasury, it
reiterated that the Court has consistently refused to extend the parameters of the Elev-
enth Amendment to political subdivisions. See id. In conclusion, the Court noted that
sovereign immunity would be extended to bistate entities created pursuant to the Com-
pact Clause when "there is good reason to believe that the States structured the new
agency to enable it to enjoy the special constitutional protection of the States' themselves,
and that Congress concurred in that purpose." Id. (quoting Lake Country, 440 U.S. at
401).
131. See Gray, 51 F.3d at 431-32. The court maintained that the primary concerns of
the Eleventh Amendment, "that federal court judgments not deplete state treasuries and
that the sovereign 'dignity' of the states be preserved ... should dominate the inquiry in
cases where it is difficult to discern whether a particular entity is an arm of the state." Id.
132. See id. at 432; see also id. at 432 n.4 (citing the circit court precedent in Hess to
support its assertion of the foundation for the Eleventh Amendment). Contrary to Gray,
the Fifth Circuit recently rejected the argument that Hess applied to a single-state entity
situation. See Pillsbury Co. v. Port of Corpus Cristi Auth., 66 F.3d 103 (5th Cir. 1995). In
Pillsbury, the Fifth Circuit limited Hess to situations involving bistate entities not created
pursuant to state statute. See id. at 104. But see Winters v. Mowery, 884 F. Supp. 321,
322-23 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (applying Hess to an "arm of the state" situation and citing Gray
for support).
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guide the court, Gray attempted to effectuate the immunity princi-
ples of Hess within the context of the Fourth Circuit single-entity
analysis. Although Hess indicated the most relevant characteristics
to consider in a multistate entity situation, it did not offer guidance
into the application of its test in an "arm of the state" Eleventh
Amendment analysisYm Notwithstanding this uncertainty, the Gray
court sought a more lucid single-entity analysis by gleaning from Hess
the dispositive nature of the state treasury factor.' While Gray so-
lidified the position of the state treasury factor in this analysis, it
amplified the very concerns Gray raised about the Hess opinion by
not specifying the course to take with regard to Lake Country's
"other relevant considerations.""
The Gray court contended that Hess did not significantly alter
the Eleventh Amendment analysis developed by the Fourth Circuit
over time.3 ' In Bockes, the Fourth Circuit found the state treasury
factor dispositive in an "arm of the state" inquiry. 7 Prior Fourth
133. See Gray, 51 F.3d at 433; supra note 110 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 69 and accompanying text; see also Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 405
(recognizing that the "vast majority of Circuits ... have concluded that the state treasury
factor is the most important factor to be considered ... and, in practice, have generally
accorded this factor dispositive weight") (quoting Brief for States of New Jersey, New
York at 18-19, Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 115 S. Ct. 394 (1995) (No. 93-
1197)).
135. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text (looking at the purpose of the
Eleventh Amendment); infra notes 136-46 and accompanying text (discussing "other
relevant considerations" in addition to the state treasury factor). While noting the effect
that Hess had on the analysis in the instant case, most notably the inclusion of the state
sovereignty issue as partially controlling, the Gray court commented that Hess also
pushed the Fourth Circuit to "formulate differently several of the other relevant consid-
erations." Gray, 51 F.3d at 434. Gray did not, however, organize the other relevant
considerations, established in Lake Country and itemized in Ristow, into a useful analysis.
In its opinion, the Fourth Circuit noted the uncertainty in the Hess opinion of the place
for the other factors in Lake Country. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. In the
end though, Gray never fully answered these questions.
136. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text. In determining the real party in
interest for Eleventh Amendment purposes, other courts have come to similar conclu-
sions. See, e.g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979); Soranno's Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan,
874 F.2d 1310, 1320 (9th Cir. 1989) (describing the nexus between the county air pollution
control district and the state treasury as the "critical factor" in the Eleventh Amendment
determination); Harden v. Adams, 760 F.2d 1158, 1163 (11th Cir. 1985) (stating the rule
that "the Eleventh Amendment barred suits by private parties seeking to impose a liabil-
ity which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury"); Berry v. Arthur, 474 F.
Supp. 427 (D.S.D. 1979). Other courts have indicated, however, that despite the impor-
tance of the state treasury factor, it is not dispositive in the analysis. See Jenson v. State
Bd. of Tax Comm., 763 F.2d 272,277 (7th Cir. 1985).
Professor John R. Pagan gives additional support to the substantial importance of the
state treasury factor. See John R. Pagan, Eleventh Amendment Analysis, 39 ARK. L. RnV.
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Circuit cases also indicated a recognition of the controlling status of
the drain on the state treasury. 8 Hess displaced traditional Fourth
Circuit analysis, however, by inserting the state sovereignty issue and
relegating the "other relevant" considerations to a less important
status in the analysis. 9 Recently, in Ristow v. South Carolina Ports
Authority 40 the Fourth Circuit noted this insertion but based its deci-
sion exclusively on the state treasury factor.141 Although Gray gave
some indication of the order of the analysis, the weight given the sov-
ereignty issue and other relevant considerations is less clear.42
447, 461 (1986). In his article, Professor Pagan outlines four questions to consider in po-
litical subdivision analysis:
(1) Will the judgment against the entity be satisfied with funds in the state treas-
ury?; (2) Does the state government exert significant control over the entity's
decisions and actions?; (3) Does the state executive branch or legislature ap-
point the entity's policymakers?; and (4) Does state law characterize the entity
as a state rather than as a subdivision?
Id. Professor Pagan noted: "Affirmative answers to these questions, especially the first,
indicate the entity is an arm of the state; negative answers suggest a subdivision." Id. It
should be noted that these characteristics show a substantial resemblance to the Lake
Country factors. See id.; supra note 100 and accompanying text.
138. See Ram Ditta v. Maryland Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n, 822 F.2d 456,
457-58 (4th Cir. 1987). In Ram Ditta, the court stated: "While many factors must be con-
sidered in determining whether an entity is the alter ego of the state, it is generally held
that the most important consideration is whether the state treasury will be responsible for
paying any judgment that might be awarded." Id. at 457 (citing Hall v. Medical College
of Ohio at Toledo, 742 F.2d 299,304 (6th Cir. 1984); Laje v. R.E. Thomason Gen. Hosp.,
665 F.2d 724,727 (5th Cir. 1982); Blake v. Kline, 612 F.2d 718,723-24,726 (3d Cir. 1979);
Miller-Davis Co. v. Illinois State Toll Highway Auth., 567 F.2d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 1977));
see also Ristow v. South Carolina Ports Auth., 27 F.3d 84, 86 (4th Cir. 1994) (indicating
that of the relevant considerations, "the responsibility of the state treasury for the judg-
ment, is generally the most important"), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 567 (1994) (remanded to the
Fourth Circuit, 58 F.3d 1051 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 514 (1995)).
139. See Gray, 51 F.3d at 434; see also Ristow v. South Carolina Ports Auth., 58 F.3d
1051, 1053 n.4 (4th Cir.) (indicating the prominence of the treasury factor and the inclu-
sion of the sovereignty issue by the Hess decision), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 514 (1995).
140. 58 F.3d 1051 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 514 (1995). Ristow involved the
Eleventh Amendment immunity of the South Carolina Ports Authority. See id. at 1051.
Fred Ristow, a truck driver, was injured as a result of the alleged negligence of a Ports
Authority employee. See id. at 1051-52. Ristow filed suit in federal court and the suit was
referred to a United States magistrate judge. See id. at 1052. The Magistrate dismissed
the complaint on the ground that the Ports Authority was immune from suit under the
Eleventh Amendment. See id. Ristow appealed and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. See id.
at 1051. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded the case back to the Fourth
Circuit for reconsideration under the principles announced in Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-
Hudson Corp., 115 S. Ct. 394 (1994). See Ristow, 58 F.3d at 1051. On its second trip
through the Fourth Circuit, the court again affirmed the Magistrate's dismissal. See id.
141. See id. at 1053 n.4. The Gray court indicated that its application of Hess would
cause the Fourth Circuit to "formulate differently several of the other relevant considera-
tions that [the Fourth Circuit] had previously enumerated." Gray, 51 F.3d at 434.
142. See Gray, 51 F.3d at 434. Gray provides that when the state treasury factor will
be unaffected by any judgment, immunity "must be determined by resort to the other
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Drawing upon the basic framework of Hess, the court neverthe-
less directed the district court's evaluation of these issues on
remand.1 43 In this discussion, the court repeatedly pressed its asser-
tion of the controlling nature of the state treasury factor in the
immunity determination. 44 Relying on Hess and its own conclusions
in Ram Ditta v. Maryland National Capital Park and Planning Com-
mission,'45 the court demonstrated its relegation of the other relevant
considerations to a secondary place in Eleventh Amendment analy-
sis.1" In remanding the case to the district court, the Fourth Circuit
laid a firm foundation for the analysis in the instant case, but left un-
certainty for Eleventh Amendment questions.
Although the Gray court recognized the weight Hess gave the
insulation of the state treasury from the judgments of Article III
courts, it left unresolved the consideration to be given the promotion
of federal-state comity. While Gray indicated the twin nature of
these concerns, it seemed to disregard the state treasury's sibling in
relevant considerations referenced by the Court, chief among which are whether the suit
will jeopardize 'the integrity retained by [the] State in our federal system,' and whether
the state possesses such control over the entity" that it could be characterized as an
"'arm of the state.'" Id (quoting Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 400). It is unclear, however,
whether these concerns carry equal weight with the factors labeled in Ristow, 58 F.3d at
1052, or are to be given special deference above the Lake Country factors. See supra note
100 and accompanying text.
143. See Gray, 51 F.3d 434-38; supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text (explaining
the court's discussion of statutory provisions indicating governmental control and pay-
ment of suits). The court remanded the issue of Eleventh Amendment immunity back to
the district court. See Gray, 51 F.3d at 434; see also Keller v. Prince George's County,
827 F.2d 952, 964 (4th Cir. 1987) (" '[t]he District Court is in the best position to address
in the first instance the competing questions of fact and state law necessary to resolve the
eleventh amendment issue.'" (quoting Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496,
515 n.19 (1982) (alteration in original))).
144. See Gray, 51 F.3d at 435-36; supra note 71 and accompanying text.
145. 822 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1987).
146. See Gray, 51 F.3d at 437. The court dismissed appellees contention that the
state's categorization of the entity should be controlling. See id The court seemed to
suggest that this determination, similar to the other considerations introduced in Lake
Country, would be regarded as secondary to the state treasury issue. See id. at 435-37.
In its brief to the Fourth Circuit, the appellees relied on North Carolina state law
mandating a conclusion that local health departments are state agencies for the purposes
of Eleventh Amendment analysis. See Appellees' Brief at 37-38, Gray (No. 94-1608); see
also Robinette v. Barriger, 116 N.C. App. 197, 202, 447 S.E.2d 498, 502 (1994) (holding
that local health departments "are agents of the state" and that a county health supervisor
is an agent of the state); EEE-ZZZ Lay Drain Co. v. North Carolina Dep't of Human
Resources, 108 N.C. App. 24, 28, 422 S.E.2d 338, 341 (1992) (concluding that a local
health department is sufficiently invested with duty and power by the state to be consid-
ered an agent thereof). After judging this factor to be non-dispositive of the immunity
question, the court questioned the use of these cases in light of Fourth Circuit precedent.
See Gray, 51 F.3d at 437-38 (citing Avery v. County of Burke, 660 F.2d 111 (4th Cir.
1981)).
1996]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the final analysis.'47 In its suggestions to the district court on re-
mand,"4 the Fourth Circuit dealt almost exclusively with the
consideration of state treasury protection.49 In emphasizing the
similarity of approach between Hess and Fourth Circuit cases such as
Ram Ditta and Bocke-which lack any real consideration of state in-
tegrity-the court picked what it needed from Hess to support its
own assertion that the two approaches were similar."
In Gray v. Laws, the court wrestled multistate jurisprudence into
a settled single-entity analysis. Although Hess discouraged a defini-
tive comparison of the two doctrines, Gray persisted in adapting the
Supreme Court's multistate interpretation to satisfy its needs in a
non-compact situation. While Gray affirmed the Fourth Circuit's
prior disposition of sovereign immunity questions, the court cut a suf-
ficient doorway for it to enter the doctrine and modify the structure
at a later date. In Gray, the court left undetermined the questions of
federal-state comity and state control in the analysis, alternatively
placing them as "chief' concerns in the immunity analysis and on an
equal footing with other Lake Country factors.' Directing the dis-
trict court's reconsideration of the instant case, Gray bedrocked the
state treasury factor as the threshold question. In total, the concrete-
ness of the state treasury determination may make the consideration
of other factors less necessary. The state treasury question, easier to
analyze through the interpretation of statutes, may work toward a
147. See Gray, 51 F.3d at 431-35. Gray repeatedly emphasized the dual foundations of
the Eleventh Amendment, as outlined in Hess. See icL; see also supra notes 68-69 and
accompanying text. Gray, uncertain as to placement of certain factors in the Hess analy-
sis, even raised concerns with Hess' lack of guidance on how to conduct Eleventh
Amendment analysis. See Gray, 51 F.3d at 433.
148. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
149. See Gray, 51 F.3d at 435-37. In addition, in acknowledging that a presumption
against immunity exists in the multistate entity context, the court noted that, in the mul-
tistate situation, no "threat to the integrity and dignity of the states" exists. See id. at 433.
It would seem that this emphasis would lend itself to great consideration of the sovereign
nature of the states in the single entity situation.
150. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text. It must be acknowledged that the
federal-state comity notion may receive less significance in an "arm of the state" issue,
such as in Gray. The court in Gray, however, relegated the state integrity concern, rec-
ognized as a foundation for the Eleventh Amendment, to a secondary status. See Gray,
51 F.3d at 434. The court stated:
If, on the other hand, the state's treasury will not be affected by a judgment in
the action, then the availability of immunity for single state entities, as opposed
to multistate entities, must be determined by resort to the other relevant consid-
erations referenced by the Court, chief among which are whether the suit will
jeopardize "the integrity retained by [the] State in our federal system."
Id. (quoting Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 400).
151. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 75
THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
greater disregard of the other considerations in the future m Thus,
Gray's adaptation of Hess, although built on a multistate foundation,
may further the progression of the single entity "arm of the state"
doctrine.
THOMAs R. JOHNSON
152. See generally Joseph R. Grodin, Are Rules Really Better Than Standards?, 45
HASTINGS L.J. 569, 569-72 (1994) (questioning recent appellate reliance on rules over
standards); Donald P. Leonard, Power and Responsibility in Evidence Law, 63 S. CAL. L.
REV. 937, 989-98 (1990) (indicating the certainty of rule-related analysis and the unpre-
dictability of judgment-based rules); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules,
56 U. CIii. L. REV. 1175, 1178-82 (1989) (discussing the necessity of rules in our judicial
system); James G. Wilson, The Morality of Formalism, 33 UCLA L. REV. 431, 434-37
(1985) (discussing the merits of both rules and standards in the context of "doctrinal for-
malism").
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